The Pentagon is gathering a narrow group of allies in Poland to discuss the future of NATO. Great Britain, France, and the Baltic states have been left out. This is not yet 'NATO 2.0' nor evidence that Washington has decided to discard old allies. However, the list of invitees clearly demonstrates a new American habit: first discussing security with a small group of states capable of quickly transforming money, geography, and industry into military capability, and only then bringing the results to the larger table.
In diplomacy, the guest list is sometimes more interesting than the agenda. Such a list is currently being analyzed in European capitals following a Politico report about a meeting that the Pentagon team plans to hold in Poland in October.
Formally, everything looks modest: a working group dedicated to the future of NATO. The initiator is U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Elbridge Colby - one of the main architects of the American concept that Europe should take on a significantly larger share of the continent's conventional defense, allowing the United States to focus more resources on other theaters. However, the composition of the group has attracted much more attention than its name. Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Finland are invited. Britain, France, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have not received invitations.
This is particularly surprising because among those left out are two European nuclear states, as well as the Baltic countries, which spend a significant percentage of their GDP on defense and are geographically located on one of the most sensitive flanks of the Alliance.
Thus, a natural question arises: what principle does the Pentagon use to compile the guest list for lunch when a portion of those who talk the most and spend the most on defense are absent from the table?
Club Within a Club
In fact, Poland is not the beginning of this story. Colby has already held two similar meetings with Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Germany, and the Netherlands. The unofficial format has been dubbed the Bergen Group. According to a diplomat from one of the invited states, its idea is not to create an alternative to NATO, but for a small group to generate practical proposals that can then be brought to the level of the entire Alliance.
This is a significant correction to the loudest interpretation.
The Pentagon has not announced the exclusion of Britain, France, or the Baltics from the NATO decision-making process. Washington also cannot unilaterally rewrite the North Atlantic Treaty through an informal working group. Alliance decisions continue to be made by its members according to established procedures.
But the method itself deserves attention. Instead of starting discussions with all 32 states immediately, the Americans gather a smaller club and try to find solutions there first.
This is the diplomatic equivalent of a small negotiating room next to a large conference hall.
Sometimes, real politics begins precisely there.
Geography Over Rhetoric
The initial narrative simply explains the group's composition: Washington allegedly invited states with real military-logistical value and sidelined those that mainly produce political declarations.
However, the facts do not allow for such a clear line to be drawn.
Britain and France remain the two most powerful European military states in NATO, possessing nuclear forces and significant expeditionary capabilities. The Baltic states spend a share of their economies on defense that doesn't correspond at all to the image of 'free riders.' France and Britain are also involved in strengthening the eastern flank. For example, in the current NATO operation Eastern Sentry, the forces of Denmark, France, and Britain are involved.
Therefore, the explanation 'we invited those who pay, and those who do not pay were left out' simply does not hold water.
But the geography of the Bergen Group is indeed interesting. Poland is the main logistical hub of the eastern flank. Finland and Norway border Russia. Sweden controls a critically important part of the Baltic space. Germany remains the central logistical and industrial hub of the continent. The Netherlands has important transport infrastructure and significant defense capabilities.
Together, they form almost a continuous arc from the North Atlantic through Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea to Poland and Central Europe.
This still does not explain the absence of other allies. The Pentagon has not publicly disclosed the selection criteria. But it makes the geographical-industrial interpretation of the group at least more plausible than the version of a simple list of 'good' and 'bad' states.
We Are Doing Everything Required of Us
The best way to convey the nervousness of Europeans is through the reaction of one representative from a state that did not receive an invitation. According to Politico, allies are trying to understand the selection criteria and the purpose of the format; one official emphasized that his country meets the requirements set by Washington but still does not understand the logic of the list.
And this phrase is far more important than the diplomatic slight.
For decades, the transatlantic system has been built not only on military capabilities but also on status. Britain had a 'special relationship' with the United States. France remained the main continental military power in Western Europe. The Baltic countries were among the most consistent supporters of the American presence on the eastern flank.
Now Washington is demonstrating that even such a political biography does not guarantee a seat in every room.
This is not necessarily the end of old Atlantism. But it is a sign of its transformation.
NATO as a Resource Table
Colby has long been advocating the idea of NATO in which Europeans bear greater responsibility for the conventional defense of their own continent. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte described the same direction in February: the U.S. remains in NATO, but the European part of the Alliance must become stronger and take on more responsibility.
Simultaneously, the Pentagon is conducting a large review of the American military presence in Europe. According to Reuters, the process may take up to six months and includes several options for changing the deployment of approximately 80,000 American troops on the continent. The U.S. Congress has set limitations that do not allow the administration to reduce the presence completely freely.
It is in this context that the Polish meeting becomes much more interesting.
If the U.S. wants to gradually transfer greater responsibility for conventional defense to Europeans, the Pentagon needs answers to very practical questions. Who provides air defense? Where are the munitions stored? Through which ports does American reinforcements arrive? By which railways do they move east? Who produces missiles? Who is capable of holding divisions? Where is equipment repaired?
After negotiations with Colby at the end of August, the Polish Ministry of Defense reported exactly such topics: American military presence in Poland, strengthening the eastern flank, and even potential joint production and maintenance of PAC-3 missiles for Patriot in Europe.
This is no longer diplomatic rhetoric.
This is logistics.
The Baltic Paradox
The most difficult to explain is the absence of the Baltic states. If the criterion is proximity to Russia, they fit perfectly. If the criterion is defense spending, they are also far from being outsiders. If it is about the eastern flank, they cannot be ignored.
One possible answer is scale.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have huge strategic significance but small economies and limited industrial capabilities. In a narrow working group, Washington may prefer states that can not only articulate the need but also provide large production, logistical, or military capabilities.
But this is merely an interpretation. The Pentagon has not confirmed that the scale of the economy or defense industry is a criterion for invitations.
And here lies a political problem. If a country stands on the front line of a potential crisis but is not in the room where the future defense model of that region is being discussed, it understandably starts asking who represents its interests.
The Franco-British Riddle
An even more complicated case is London and Paris.
Their absence cannot be explained by a lack of military weight. Both states have nuclear weapons. Britain is one of the closest military partners of the U.S. France has one of the most comprehensive military systems in Europe - from nuclear submarines to its own aviation and missile industry.
That is why their absence is politically significant regardless of the reasons.
However, there is currently no basis to take the next step and claim that Washington is deliberately 'punishing hawks.' Politico reports a lack of understanding of the criteria even among diplomats, rather than announcing an American doctrine of excluding Britain and France.
Not knowing the motive is not evidence of a hidden motive.
But diplomacy rarely likes a vacuum. If Washington does not explain the criteria, European capitals will begin to invent them themselves.
From NATO 1.0 to NATO 3.0
Interestingly, Poland itself uses even more radical terminology. After the August negotiations with Colby, the Polish Ministry of Defense reported that the parties discussed the implementation of the concept of 'NATO 3.0' and the review of the American military presence in Europe.
The content of this formula is more important than the version number.
The new American model does not necessarily imply a U.S. exit from Europe. On the contrary, Rutte reiterated on September 30 that Washington remains committed to the defense of Europe, including both conventional and nuclear deterrence.
What changes is the division of labor.
The U.S. increasingly wants to be a strategic guarantor, a supplier of part of the critical capabilities, and a last-resort reserve. Europeans must provide more soldiers, munitions, air defense, logistics, and money.
In such a system, the value of an ally is measured not only by how right the things they say in Brussels are. It is increasingly measured by what they can bring to the table.
A Small Table for a Large Alliance
Thus, the meeting in Poland should not yet be called the death of British influence, the capitulation of France, or evidence that the Baltics have been left to their fate. There are no facts for such conclusions.
But one should not underestimate the format itself.
The Pentagon has created a small group within the largest military alliance in the world. This group has already met twice. Now it meets for the third time - in Poland, on the eastern flank, at a moment when Washington is reviewing its military presence in Europe and demanding significantly greater defensive autonomy from its allies.
Perhaps the Bergen Group will remain just a technical workshop where a few countries prepare ideas for all 32 allies.
Or perhaps it demonstrates a broader trend in American foreign policy: large multilateral institutions remain, but the most important issues are increasingly resolved first in smaller coalitions of states that Washington considers most useful for the specific task.
For Europe, the difference between these two scenarios is enormous.
So far, only one thing is known: NATO has 32 members. But when the Pentagon wanted to talk about its future, it needed significantly fewer chairs.