After the visit of the American emissaries, the Ukrainian information space quickly reduced the complicated negotiations to a simple formula: Moscow made demands, Washington rewrote them, and Kyiv was offered to agree. The reality is more unpleasant, but also more complicated. The territorial issue indeed remains the main obstacle; however, the Americans did not come empty-handed. They are trying to forge an agreement in which territory, security, sanctions, economy, and the cost of continuing the war become parts of one term sheet.
Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff arrived in Kyiv on September 6 immediately after three hours of negotiations with Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The very sequence of the trip created an ideal picture for Telegram: the Americans listened to the Kremlin, boarded a plane, and brought its demands to Zelensky.
From here, only one step remained to the formula of “they came and offered to capitulate.”
But the available facts present a more complicated picture. Reuters reported that the Moscow round did not bring an obvious breakthrough, and after meetings in Kyiv, the American emissaries spoke about an attempt to restore the negotiation process. Two days later, Zelensky publicly stated that Kushner and Witkoff presented several “decent ideas” regarding the end of the war.
This does not mean that the American plan is beneficial for Ukraine. But it already badly contradicts the version that there is no plan at all.
The most unpleasant part of the rumors is true
Territory is indeed the central issue.
On September 12, Kushner articulated it very directly at the YES forum in Kyiv. According to him, if Ukraine agreed to the territorial concessions demanded by Putin, the other points of the agreement could already be negotiated. At the same time, he emphasized that Ukraine does not agree to this, and the task of the American mediators is to find a “creative solution” that considers Ukraine’s position and allows for ending the war.
This is an important distinction.
Washington does not hide that the Russian territorial demands are on the table. But this does not mean that the American delegation simply handed Kyiv the Russian ultimatum as its own proposal.
On the contrary, Kushner's very statement about the need to find another formula means that the term sheet is not yet closed, especially in the most important column.
Therefore, the debate now is not about whether there is a problem in Donbas. It exists. The debate is about how it can be sidestepped in the big agreement: to freeze it along the actual line of conflict, create a special regime, separate the issue of actual control from legal recognition, or find another construct.
None of these models has yet been publicly recorded as an agreed-upon solution.
FedEx diplomacy
The image of Witkoff and Kushner as diplomatic couriers is appealing in its simplicity. The Kremlin dictates the list. The Americans put it in their portfolio. Kyiv receives the package.
But Trump’s diplomacy works differently - and not necessarily more comfortably for Ukraine.
Kushner himself spoke in Kyiv about post-war “economic prosperity” as part of the American vision for resolution. At the same time, the Trump administration ties relations with Ukraine to investments, resources, and future reconstruction. On September 24, Zelensky met in New York with leaders of major American financial companies; investments, reconstruction, and the possibility of creating a sovereign fund were discussed.
This allows for a broader structure to be seen.
For classical diplomacy, a peace agreement is primarily about borders, guarantees, and ceasefires. For Trump’s transactional diplomacy, it potentially is also an economic agreement: who invests after the war, who gains access to projects, how the country is rebuilt, what happens with sanctions, and what the economic cost of violating the agreements will be.
This does not prove the existence of some already agreed-upon “big package.” But it explains why describing the negotiations solely with the words “give up Donbas” is insufficient.
Territory is the heaviest column in the American term sheet. But it is not its only column.
The whip is on the table
Similarly, the popular thesis that Moscow is simply “leading Trump by the nose” while he refuses to impose sanctions also needs correction.
On September 18, Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The law creates additional mechanisms to pressure the Russian energy and defense sectors, shadow fleet, and countries that continue extensive economic interactions with Russia. It also provides for the possibility of high tariffs against Moscow's trade partners.
This does not mean that the sanctions lever will necessarily be used as harshly as possible. On the contrary, the law’s structure leaves the president considerable room to apply individual measures.
And that is why the whip may be more useful before the strike than after it.
As long as the sanction is not applied at full capacity, it can be used as a threat. After it is applied, it ceases to be a potential concession and becomes a new starting point for negotiations.
But this does not mean that the White House is intentionally “holding sanctions in reserve” solely for the sake of secret bargaining with the Kremlin. There is no public evidence of such a motive. Washington's decisions are also influenced by relations with major buyers of Russian oil, energy prices, and broader American trade interests. A few days after the law was signed, for example, American and Indian foreign ministers separately discussed its implications for India.
Realpolitik here is not about whether Trump necessarily outplayed Putin or Putin outplayed Trump. It is about the fact that the unused lever is also an asset.
Energy war did not start because of an empty launcher
It is even more dangerous to explain Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy solely by the shortage of Patriot interceptors.
The shortage of anti-aircraft missiles is real. Ukraine is currently negotiating for more stable supplies of munitions for Patriot, which are primarily necessary for intercepting ballistic missiles.
But causality does not work so simply.
On September 30, Russia carried out another large-scale combined attack on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. According to Ukrainian data, nearly 190 drones and ballistic missiles were used; critical energy facilities in several regions were affected. The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the attacks on energy and other infrastructure targets, although the parties characterize their purpose differently.
Energy has long been a separate theater in this war. Its destruction creates not only a problem of light in apartments. It increases the costs for industry, worsens transport operations, forces businesses to invest in backup power supply, increases the state’s need for imports and repairs, and puts additional pressure on the budget.
That is why energy strikes in War 4.0 are both military and economic.
The shortage of interceptors makes such attacks more effective. But it does not explain the strategy itself.
Patriot is also accounting
And here, the information dispute suddenly returns to the core issue of negotiations - resources.
Ukraine needs not just additional air defense batteries. It needs a steady flow of expensive interceptors. The U.S. and its allies must simultaneously maintain their own stocks, fulfill other defense obligations, and ramp up production.
Thus, the formula “America just has to give more missiles” is politically understandable but industrially incomplete. A missile needs to be produced first.
Similarly, Moscow has its own war economy: the production of drones and missiles, revenues from energy exports, sanctions costs, the shortage of specific components, and the need to finance an increasingly expensive military apparatus.
Ukraine, in turn, spends about $190 million a day on the war, according to estimates cited by Reuters in September.
The negotiation table thus increasingly resembles not a map with flags, but a business balance sheet.
Each side has assets, liabilities, cash flow, and a reserve of strength.
Catastrophe as a genre
This is where Telegram analytics gains a huge advantage over real diplomacy.
Real diplomacy is boring. It consists of formulations, protocols, sanction exceptions, supply schedules, guarantees, control lines, and endless legal disclaimers.
Telegram requires something different.
“There will be no peace.” “We will be completely extinguished.” “Trump understands nothing.” “The Americans came to demand capitulation.”
Such absolute formulations turn a complex system of uncertainties into a simple emotional story. But the facts so far do not allow for speaking of either guaranteed peace or guaranteed failure of negotiations.
After the September meetings, Kyiv is preparing for a possible resumption of trilateral negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. in October.
This is not proof of imminent peace.
But it is also not the behavior of parties that consider the diplomatic channel dead.
Term sheet without the main figure
Therefore, there is one important truth in the story of the “American couriers of the Kremlin”: Russia indeed demands territorial concessions, and American mediators are indeed compelled to bring this position to Kyiv. Mediation is impossible without passing on the unpleasant demands of the other side.
But passing on a demand is not the same as accepting it.
Kushner publicly acknowledged that it is the territorial issue preventing a deal from being closed, and simultaneously stated that the Americans are looking for another formula. Zelensky stated after the negotiations about “decent ideas.” The negotiation channel is not closed. The sanctions mechanism has been strengthened. Russian strikes continue. Ukraine responds with strikes on Russian energy infrastructure.
This does not resemble either a ready peace or a simple ultimatum.
It resembles bargaining, in which each side is simultaneously negotiating and trying to improve its position through force.
That is why the biggest mistake is to look for proof in every visit that “everything is already decided.” In a war of such magnitude, the final document will not be determined solely by the wishes of Trump, Putin, or Zelensky. It will be determined by the front, stockpiles of missiles, production lines, budget deficits, energy, sanctions, and each side’s ability to pay for another year of war.
Kushner and Witkoff did not bring capitulation to Kyiv. They brought an unresolved term sheet. And the most expensive column in it is still empty.