The fifth year of a great war has tested not only Ukraine and Russia but the entire Western support system. Europe is still able to finance Ukraine's defense, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to provide it with the most deficient weaponry. Washington seeks to expedite diplomatic resolution, while Moscow attempts to turn peace talks into a review of the security architecture of the whole continent. A dangerous pause has emerged between a war of attrition and a swift agreement: the old mechanism is already losing effectiveness, and a new one does not yet exist.
In international diplomacy, there is a special category of documents that can create an illusion of progress even before the parties have agreed on the main points. One of them is a term sheet, or a document with the main conditions of a future agreement.
In business, it defines the parameters of a possible operation. In high politics, it may serve as a way to record a preliminary compromise while leaving the most challenging issues for subsequent negotiations.
However, the Russia-Ukraine war poorly lends itself to corporate logic. Here, it is not possible to simply agree on a price, sign a document, and part ways. Behind each point of a future agreement lie territories, military guarantees, international obligations, and the risk of new conflict.
That is why the activation of diplomatic contacts in November 2026 raises a question that has no compelling answer yet: Is the war coming to an end, or are the parties just preparing for the next stage of confrontation?
To understand this dilemma, it is necessary to assess the condition of the mechanism that has supported Ukraine’s defense over previous years.
Managed Attrition: A Strategy That Is No Longer Working
For a significant part of the war, Western assistance to Ukraine has had a contradictory nature.
The United States and European allies have provided arms, financing, intelligence support, and technologies without which Ukraine's defense would have faced much more serious difficulties.
However, the volumes and pace of supplies have not always met the needs to achieve a strategic turnaround.
This contradiction can be described as a model of managed attrition: Ukraine receives enough resources to continue resisting, but not necessarily so much as to radically change the balance of power.
This logic can be traced in discussions among military analysts, including experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and in the journalistic assessments of Vitaly Portnikov. At the same time, this is more an analytical generalization of the consequences of Western policy than a proven joint strategy of all allies.
After all, the Western coalition has never been homogeneous.
Some states insisted on rapidly increasing assistance. Others feared escalation, the depletion of their own stocks, or the domestic political consequences of prolonged support.
As a result, the system worked, but was constantly lagging behind.
While Ukraine needed artillery shells, allies agreed to produce them. When there was a need for long-range strike capabilities, discussions about acceptable boundaries of their use continued. When Russian strikes intensified the load on air defense, it turned out that even the richest states did not have unlimited stocks of interceptors.
This model allowed avoiding catastrophic scenarios, but gradually accumulated its own contradictions.
And now these contradictions are becoming one of the main factors of the diplomatic process.
There Are Missiles, But Not the Ones That Are Most Needed
The British aid package announced on November 17 demonstrates the asymmetry of Western military capabilities.
According to the reported data, London has allocated approximately £240 million in support, including over a thousand short-range missiles known as LMM, also known as Martlet, and additional radar systems.
Such assets can play an important role in combating drones and other aerial threats.
However, they do not replace interceptors needed to counter modern ballistic missiles.
This is where a structural problem arises.
Western industry can relatively quickly scale up the production of individual categories of weapons. But sophisticated missiles required for the Patriot, IRIS-T, and SAMP/T systems need much longer production cycles, specialized components, and expensive technological lines.
Even a significant increase in funding does not mean that the necessary ammunition will appear in a few weeks.
According to some industry estimates, bringing part of the European defense programs to planned capacities may stretch until 2028. However, these timelines vary depending on the manufacturer and type of armament.
Meanwhile, Ukraine needs missiles now.
This forces Kyiv to demand interceptors from existing military stockpiles from its partners, with subsequent replenishment of arsenals through new factory supplies.
For European governments, such a scheme means a temporary reduction of their own defense reserves.
For Ukraine, it represents the possibility of maintaining the effectiveness of air defense in the coming months.
«The West has learned to finance Ukrainian resistance, but has not yet learned to produce the most necessary weapons at the speed demanded by the war».
This is the main paradox of modern military aid: funds can be allocated by political decision, but production capacities cannot be created with a single vote.
European Billions and Political Arithmetic
The financial situation looks no less contradictory.
The European Union is discussing new mechanisms to support Ukraine in 2027, including the possibility of mobilizing tens of billions of euros.
The provided estimates include a credit package of approximately €45 billion, while Ukraine's overall need for external financing next year is assessed significantly higher.
But even if the necessary funds can be mobilized, the question remains about their allocation.
Civil budget support, defense procurement, loans, and grants are different financial instruments with varying usage rules.
Money designated for supporting public services and macro-financial stability cannot automatically be redirected to purchase missiles or military equipment.
Moreover, European decisions depend on political agreements among member states.
Hungary and Slovakia have repeatedly demonstrated skepticism toward certain support mechanisms for Ukraine. The positions of the Czech Republic and Bulgaria depend on specific proposals and domestic political circumstances, so to speak of a unified bloc of four states that consistently opposes all aid would be an oversimplification.
However, the very problem of budget consensus does not go away.
European governments must simultaneously finance Ukraine's defense, increase their own military expenditures, support social programs, and respond to economic difficulties.
In such circumstances, each new multi-year aid package becomes subject to increasingly complex political bargaining.
Europe remains economically capable of supporting Ukraine. But economic capability and political willingness to regularly make the necessary decisions are not the same thing.
Why Trump Wants to End the War Quicker
For Donald Trump's administration, the Russia-Ukraine war is not only a question of European security.
It also affects the allocation of American resources among different strategic directions.
In Washington, competition with China remains increasingly important—in the fields of technology, naval presence, trade, and global political influence.
Prolonged war in Europe requires diplomatic attention, financial resources, and defense production that could be redirected to other priorities.
In this context, the White House’s desire to expedite negotiations has its own strategic logic.
The American administration may view cessation of hostilities as a way to relieve the burden on the U.S. and shift the majority of the responsibility for European security onto the Europeans themselves.
It is here that the interest in a framework agreement arises—a document that would allow for recording the main parameters for resolution before completing complicated negotiations on the mechanisms of its implementation.
But speed has its price.
The shorter the time frame allocated for reaching an agreement, the stronger the pressure on the participants in the negotiations.
For Ukraine, this creates the risk of agreeing to conditions that do not provide long-term security.
For Europe, the risk is to face the necessity to fulfill agreements in which its role was limited.
For Russia, there is the possibility to use American eagerness for quick results to raise its own demands.
Moscow Raises the Price of Peace
This last factor may prove decisive.
Reports from November consultations in Abu Dhabi indicate that the Russian side returned demands to the negotiation process that go far beyond territorial settlement of the war in Ukraine.
These include restrictions on NATO military infrastructure, a refusal of further expansion of the Alliance, and a review of specific elements of the European deterrence system.
Such proposals were put forth by Moscow back in December 2021.
If they have again become part of the negotiation position, it indicates that the Kremlin is trying to turn the resolution of the Ukrainian war into a matter of broader agreement with the United States.
This strategy has an obvious negotiating advantage: it allows starting the bargaining with maximalist demands and later presenting partial concessions as compromises.
However, it simultaneously complicates reaching a compromise.
The question of Ukraine's future NATO membership, the placement of Western military forces, or French and British nuclear deterrence cannot be resolved by the agreement of Washington and Moscow alone.
They directly relate to sovereign states that have their own security interests and international obligations.
Thus, the Russian attempt to broaden the negotiation subject may contradict American aspirations for quick results.
The White House wants to shorten the negotiation process. The Kremlin, on the other hand, may be trying to include more and more issues in it.
This creates a fundamental contradiction between two possible approaches to ending the war.
Brussels Between Two Undesirable Scenarios
For the European Union, the situation is particularly complicated.
The first scenario envisions the continuation of high-intensity warfare for several more years.
It will require new budgetary commitments, a massive increase in defense production, and readiness to compensate for possible reductions in American support.
Europe has significant economic resources, but their mobilization requires time and political consensus.
The second scenario—a rapid peace agreement—may not align with long-term European security interests.
If the agreement entails restrictions on NATO's military presence or the actual recognition of special rights for Russia to influence neighboring states, it will create serious risks for the entire continent.
Thus, Brussels finds itself faced with a choice between a costly war and a potentially dangerous peace.
However, this dilemma is not completely without alternatives.
European states may try to combine support for Ukraine's defense capabilities with diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a sustainable resolution.
The key question remains whether they can develop a common position and provide it with sufficient military and financial resources.
Without this, Europe risks remaining not a full-fledged participant in negotiations but a side that will pay for their consequences.
Has the Model of Endless War Really Exhausted Itself?
To claim the definitive end of the previous model of Western support would be premature.
Ukraine continues to receive military assistance. European states are investing in defense production. New financial mechanisms remain under negotiation.
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that sustaining the war at its current level without significant changes in approach is becoming harder.
The Western coalition has three main options.
The first is to continue the current model, compensating for deficiencies with individual aid packages and gradually increasing production.
The second is to significantly increase defense investments, expedite the transfer of existing stocks, and create a long-term system for supplying the Ukrainian army.
The third is to focus on diplomatic resolution, attempting to reduce the need for further funding for the war.
The problem is that none of these options guarantees a quick result.
The first may lead to further attrition. The second requires political will and time. The third depends on the readiness of Russia and Ukraine to agree to acceptable terms.
Therefore, negotiations and military support are not necessarily mutually exclusive scenarios.
On the contrary, maintaining Ukraine’s defense capability may be a necessary condition for reaching an agreement that does not become merely a short pause before a new war.
The Pulse of the Agreement: Why a Quick Peace May Turn Out to Be a Long Process
A peace agreement makes sense only when the parties are willing to fulfill its terms.
Herein lies the main problem of the current diplomacy.
Washington seeks a swift political result.
Moscow may strive to use the negotiations to review the broader strategic balance.
Ukraine needs guarantees that reduce the risk of renewed aggression.
Europe tries to avoid agreements that may weaken its own security system.
These goals are not necessarily completely incompatible. But they are so different that even agreeing on general principles may not lead to a swift end to the war.
Especially if the parties attempt to simultaneously resolve issues of territories, sanctions, military guarantees, NATO, and strategic deterrence.
«The greatest danger of the current negotiations is not that the parties will fail to sign an agreement. The danger is that they will sign a document that does not eliminate the causes of the next war».
This question is existentially significant for Ukraine.
Ceasing hostilities may reduce human losses and create conditions for economic recovery. But without effective security mechanisms, it may not guarantee lasting peace.
For Europe, the main risk is that short-term stabilization may be achieved at the cost of long-term weakening of its strategic positions.
Is the Patient More Alive Than Dead?
If we assess the state of the previous model of war by attrition, its prospects appear increasingly less convincing.
It has not disappeared, but its weaknesses have become more apparent: limited stocks of complex weapons, long production cycles, political fatigue, and rising budgetary needs.
However, the alternative model of swift diplomatic resolution has yet to demonstrate sufficient stability.
The American administration seeks to expedite negotiations. Russia may attempt to expand them to a review of the entire architecture of European security. European capitals want to maintain influence over decisions that will determine their future.
As a result, a situation arises where the old order no longer delivers the desired outcomes, while the new one has not yet formed.
This makes the current diplomatic moment particularly dangerous.
The war may continue not because all its participants view such a scenario as optimal, but because none of them sees a sufficiently acceptable alternative.
On the other hand, the desire for a quick resolution of the conflict may lead to an agreement that will not withstand the first serious test.
Thus, the answer to the question about the state of the «patient» remains ambiguous.
The model of an endless war with measured support is increasingly losing economic and political attractiveness. But the peace term sheet has yet to become a full-fledged treatment plan.
And if Western states cannot align their strategic goals, Ukraine’s future risks becoming trapped between two unfinished processes—war, which is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, and peace, whose terms are currently impossible to agree upon.
The most challenging task of international diplomacy today lies not in simply halting hostilities. It lies in creating conditions under which their resumption becomes less likely.
After all, the true measure of success of any future agreement will not be the speed of its signing but the duration of the peace it secures.