Washington threatens Beijing with new weapons for Taiwan just when Donald Trump needs Xi Jinping's help in another part of the world. This may be a coincidence. But the transactional diplomacy of the White House is built on turning individual crises into chips at one big table.
In Donald Trump's diplomacy, a threat often precedes an offer.
If a concession is needed from an opponent, you must first demonstrate what the cost of refusal could be. The prospect of a new large American arms package for Taiwan valued at around $14 billion just ahead of the expected contact between Trump and Xi Jinping fits well into this logic.
For Beijing, this is one of the most sensitive topics.
China views Taiwan not as an ordinary foreign policy issue but as part of its own territory. Therefore, every major American arms supply to Taipei inevitably carries much greater political weight than its nominal value.
Beijing threatens consequences.
Trump remains calm.
His formula - «we will come to an understanding» - almost perfectly describes the transactional approach of the current White House.
First, raise the price.
Then, offer a discount.
$14 billion as a Bargaining Chip
It would be a mistake to automatically consider the package for Taiwan to be fictitious.
America's rearmament of the island has its own strategic logic, which exists independently of Ukraine. Washington has been trying for years to raise the cost of a potential Chinese operation against Taiwan.
But timing matters.
If the decision on the package remains politically managed just ahead of important negotiations with Xi, it also becomes a lever.
Washington can convey two messages to Beijing at the same time.
We are ready to arm Taiwan much faster.
But we are ready to talk.
It is this space between the two statements that constitutes the negotiations.
Xi Also Needs an Agreement
It is incorrect to imagine this construct as one-sided American blackmail.
China has its own reasons to negotiate.
Beijing needs predictability in trade with the U.S. A new round of tariff wars is undesirable for the Chinese economy. The prospect of further strengthening American restrictions on access to advanced semiconductors, equipment, and artificial intelligence technologies is even more painful.
Washington controls some of the bottlenecks critical to Chinese technological development.
Beijing, in turn, has its own levers.
Rare earth metals.
Industrial chains.
The American market for Chinese exports.
And Moscow.
This last asset makes the Ukrainian war a potential part of a much larger American-Chinese deal.
The Chinese Key to Moscow
China does not control the Kremlin.
But the assertion that Beijing has no serious influence over Russia would be just as incorrect.
After severing significant parts of its economic ties with the West, China has become a critically important trading partner for Russia.
The Chinese market absorbs Russian energy resources. Goods, equipment, electronics, and components that have become much more difficult for Russia to access go through the Chinese economy.
This creates asymmetry.
Moscow may ignore Beijing's wishes.
But doing so has become more expensive.
That is why for Washington, Xi Jinping is potentially a much more valuable participant in the Ukrainian negotiation process than yet another European mediator.
Europe may persuade Kyiv.
China can speak to Moscow in the language of economic interests.
Not to Press but to Convince
However, the formula «Xi will dictate - Putin will agree» is too simplistic.
China is not interested in a humiliating defeat for Russia.
A weak but stable Moscow is a useful strategic partner for Beijing: a supplier of resources, a counterweight to the U.S., and a vast land neighbor that does not pose serious problems for China at its border.
Therefore, Beijing is unlikely to simply comply with an American request for «forcing Russia».
A much more realistic construct is another.
Washington must offer Xi something valuable enough for China to see the benefits of a controlled end or freezing of the war.
And here, Taiwan becomes particularly interesting as a bargaining chip.
Taipei in Exchange for Moscow?
In the simplest version of a grand bargain, the logic could look something like this.
Washington slows down certain moves that Beijing considers particularly dangerous: part of military supplies to Taiwan, new technological restrictions, or the threat of secondary sanctions.
China, in turn, uses its economic influence to nudge Moscow toward an acceptable formula for Washington to halt hostilities.
There does not necessarily have to be a direct document with the formula «Taiwan for Ukraine».
Great powers almost never formalize such things.
Sufficient parallel concessions are enough.
One package is postponed.
One sanctions decision is softened.
One Chinese conversation with the Kremlin becomes significantly more persuasive.
After which all parties assure that these events are in no way related.
Problem for Taiwan
For Taipei, the very possibility of such logic is unpleasant.
American policy has for decades tried to convince partners that their security issues are not a matter for negotiation with great powers.
Trump's transactional diplomacy makes this assumption less comfortable.
If a military package can be accelerated, delayed, or altered according to a broader negotiation context, its value becomes double.
It is simultaneously a weapon for Taiwan and a bargaining asset for Washington.
For the White House, this is effective.
For the ally - it is nerve-wracking.
Ukraine Needs China
For Kyiv, the situation is even more complicated.
On the one hand, real Chinese pressure on Moscow could significantly increase the likelihood of a ceasefire.
On the other hand, China is unlikely to use its influence for the sake of Ukraine's maximal demands.
Beijing needs stability.
Not a Ukrainian victory.
The Chinese interest lies in ending the war on terms that do not destroy Russia, do not provoke a new major confrontation with Europe, and allow for the restoration of predictability in global trade.
This may align with Ukraine's interests at one point - halting hostilities.
And it diverges significantly regarding the conditions under which they will cease.
Trump Needs a Clock
There is another participant in the negotiations - the American political calendar.
The midterm elections for Congress are approaching.
A significant foreign policy achievement for Trump before November would be extremely beneficial.
Complete peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian war may be unattainable.
A ceasefire is a much more realistic goal.
The White House could present even a temporary freeze as evidence that the president stopped a war that traditional diplomacy could not end for years.
Xi does not have an American electoral calendar.
This gives Beijing an advantage.
Trump is in a bigger hurry.
And he who needs an agreement by a specific date usually has a weaker negotiating position.
The Big Table
That is why the Ukrainian peace track is becoming increasingly difficult to consider in isolation.
On one table lies Ukraine.
On another - Taiwan.
On the third - tariffs.
On the fourth - semiconductors and AI.
On the fifth - Russian oil, Chinese exports, and secondary sanctions.
Formally, these are different negotiations.
For Trump, they may be parts of one agreement.
This is the main difference between transactional diplomacy and classical diplomacy.
It does not ask which department the problem belongs to.
It asks:
what can I give here to get what I need there?
Two at One Table
If Washington and Beijing really find an acceptable package, the Ukrainian negotiation process could change dramatically.
To American pressure on Kyiv, Chinese influence on Moscow would be added.
Vitkoff and Kushner could propose a «creative formula» in a situation where the two largest economies in the world are interested in at least a pause.
This does not guarantee an agreement.
Russia remains an independent player. Ukraine could also refuse conditions it considers unacceptable.
But the negotiating space will become significantly narrower.
In such a scenario, the most important meeting regarding Ukraine may happen even without the Ukrainian president and without the Russian one.
It will take place between Trump and Xi.
Therefore, the story of the $14 billion for Taiwan is interesting not only because of the number of missiles and planes that Taipei could potentially receive.
It shows how big the board has become on which Washington is trying to complete the Ukrainian game.
In great diplomacy, a chip rarely remains on the table where it was placed.