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The High Cost of Security Checkpoints: What One Arrest and One Seized Weapon Really Cost

Висока ціна перевірок безпеки: що насправді коштує одне затримання та один вилучений арсенал. Photo: ХВИЛЯ

The High Cost of Security Checkpoints: What One Arrest and One Seized Weapon Really Cost

An analysis of rear-area security checkpoints in Ukraine, based on the official 2024 report from the Patrol Police, reveals a low level of effectiveness in detecting suspicious persons and illegal weapons trafficking. These checkpoints are a common security measure in conflict-affected regions. The country maintains 275 official checkpoints, staffed by a thousand police officers. Over the course of the year, 221 individuals potentially linked to sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRGs) were detained. Furthermore, across all posts nationwide, the locations of 1,600 wanted persons were established.

The data indicates that each checkpoint detects, on average, less than one suspected saboteur per year. Consequently, a single checkpoint must operate for over 13 months to filter out just one suspect. This supports the view of experts, including Serhiy Shyshkin, who noted that detaining 221 people across 275 checkpoints appears highly inefficient. He stated that

"less than one suspect per checkpoint per year"
raises serious questions about the rationale for maintaining such a large number of posts.

Checkpoint Expenditures and Weapon Seizures

The costs associated with these operations are significant. For instance, the expense of processing a single drunk driving report is estimated at half a million hryvnias, while the fine for this offense is only 17,000 hryvnias. Serhiy Shyshkin emphasized this disparity, remarking,

"They earned 17 [thousand], but spent half a million,"
which fuels concerns about the economic efficiency of these measures. The expert likened the process to
"building a ship in a bottle: you stuff in the parts and glue and shake it for a long time—sometimes a ship comes out."

It is also notable that seizing each unit of illegal weaponry costs taxpayers millions of hryvnias. This analysis of rear checkpoint performance casts doubt on their overall utility and prompts questions about the real costs of maintaining this particular security format. Given the substantial expenditures that are not offset by results, it may be necessary to consider alternative approaches to ensuring security and combating the illegal arms trade within the country.

The findings highlight a pressing need to reassess security strategy in Ukraine, as the insufficient effectiveness of checkpoints may indicate a requirement to optimize law enforcement resources. This internal security debate occurs against the backdrop of a full-scale war, where resource allocation is critically important.