The American Congress has passed one of the toughest sanction laws during the war: new restrictions against Russian banks, the energy sector, the defense sector, and the "shadow fleet", as well as tariffs of up to 100% against the largest buyers of Russian energy resources. But the most important word here is "up to". Congress has created a weapon, but the decision on the power of the shot is largely left to Donald Trump.
On September 16, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 with 262 votes in favor and 159 against - a law named after the late Republican senator Lindsey Graham, who for years advocated for secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian energy resources. Earlier, the Senate supported the document with 86 votes to 11. On September 18, there was an important change that had not been present in the initial version of this text: Trump signed H.R. 5334, and it has already become law.
The name "infernal sanctions" sounds impressive. And part of the document is indeed painful for Moscow. The law expands sanctions against Russian officials, major financial institutions, energy and defense structures, as well as networks that help Russia bypass restrictions through the so-called shadow fleet. But the politically most interesting part of the law is not directly aimed at Russia. It is targeted at those who continue to buy its oil and gas.
Not 100%, but from zero to 100
This is where the main nuance begins. The law does not mean that tomorrow all Chinese or Indian imports will automatically face an additional 100% tariff. It creates a mechanism for applying tariffs of up to 100% against the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas and states that play a significant role in circumventing oil sanctions. China and India, due to the scale of their purchases, find themselves at the center of this construct.
This is fundamentally different from an embargo. An embargo tells the buyer: stop buying. The new American construct says: if you continue to buy, the U.S. president can make your access to the American market significantly more expensive.
For India, it is a choice between cheaper Russian oil and the potential price of access to the American consumer. For China, the scale of the conflict would be even greater since it involves not just oil but the relationship between the two largest economies in the world.
On paper, this is an extremely powerful lever. But its strength does not depend on what Congress wrote, but on how exactly the White House decides to use it.
The Sanction Guillotine Turned into a Regulator
The initial political idea of Graham was significantly rougher. Earlier versions of the legislation discussed tariffs of up to 500%. In the final construct, the ceiling was lowered to 100%, exceptions were created for some countries, and the president received an important role in the practical application of the mechanism.
Especially important are waivers - presidential exceptions. The Trump administration emphasized before the adoption of the document that the law leaves significant discretion to the president regarding such exceptions and allows suspension of sanctions after a peace agreement is reached.
This changes the very nature of the law. Instead of an automatic sanction guillotine, Washington got a pressure regulator. It can be turned to 20, 50, or 100%. It can threaten to increase. It can offer reduction. It can make exceptions in exchange for behavioral change.
And that is why Graham’s law is not only a sanctions act. It is also a trade tool for the U.S. president.
Indian Trade
The most interesting part of this construct may work with New Delhi. India became one of the key buyers of Russian oil after 2022, but at the same time has a huge economic interest in relations with the United States.
Imagine a simple negotiation situation. Washington threatens to raise the tariff. New Delhi agrees to cut purchases of Russian oil, increase American imports, or make concessions in another area of trade negotiations. After this, the White House may soften the tariff regime or utilize the exemptions provided by the law.
For Washington, this could be a successful deal. For American exporters - too. For Russia, the outcome will depend on whether the physical volumes of its oil sales decrease or whether only the routes and prices change.
This is where the line between sanctions as economic warfare and sanctions as a negotiating lever lies.
China - a Whole Different Weight
With Beijing, the situation is more complicated. Theoretically, a 100% tariff against Chinese goods looks like an extremely strong threat. Practically, its full-scale application would mean a serious trade shock for the United States itself.
Therefore, the maximum rate is not necessarily the most likely bet. It can be the upper limit of negotiations.
Trump has the opportunity to tell Xi Jinping: the continuation of massive support for Russian energy exports will come at a price. Beijing, in turn, can respond with its own trade, raw material, and technological levers.
Thus, Russian oil becomes one of the points in a much broader U.S.-China trade.
And this brings us back to the main feature of Trump’s diplomacy: different negotiation tables can easily transform into one.
The Most Painful Part for Moscow May Not Be Tariff-Related
However, reducing the entire law to tariffs would be a mistake. H.R. 5334 also provides for sanction pressure on Russian financial institutions, energy projects, defense chains, and the "shadow fleet". The latter has become one of the key mechanisms that allows Russia to transport oil while bypassing certain Western restrictions.
Such sanctions are unlikely to physically stop Russian oil exports. But they can increase its cost price: more complicated insurance, more expensive financing, risks for ports and intermediaries, and the need to change vessels, flags, owners, and payment routes more frequently.
For an oil state, this matters. Russia does not necessarily have to lose all exports for sanctions to start working. It’s enough for each barrel sold to bring in less net income.
Therefore, the real indicator of the law’s effectiveness is not the number of companies on the sanction list. It is the change in Russia's net oil revenue.
For Ukraine - Sanctions, For Trump - Leverage
There is one more detail that is easy to lose in the pro-Ukrainian rhetoric surrounding the document. H.R. 5334 is a sanctions law, not a new package of military funding for Ukraine. It creates additional economic tools to pressure Russia and its trading partners, but by itself is not analogous to large arms appropriation packages for Kyiv. The official text of the law focuses on sanctions, tariffs, and other restrictive measures.
For Ukraine, this is an important difference. Sanctions can reduce the opponent’s resources in the medium term. But they do not turn into Patriot missiles, ammunition, or drones tomorrow.
For Trump, however, the construct is almost ideal. Congress has given the president a legislatively framed lever against buyers of Russian energy. The White House can now use it simultaneously to pressure Moscow, negotiate with India, and bargain with China.
This has raised objections from some Democrats. The leader of the Democrats in the House of Representatives, Hakeem Jeffries, in particular, expressed concerns about the expansion of the president's tariff powers and the potential consequences for the American economy. At the same time, the law received significant bipartisan support: it was voted for by a majority of Republicans and 58 Democrats.
Thus, calling the document simply "protectionist decoration" would be an exaggeration. The sanctions part is entirely real. But it’s also hard to deny that the tariff part significantly strengthens the president's negotiating arsenal.
Papers Hell
Now everything depends on application. If Washington actually forces major buyers to reduce Russian imports while hitting banks, logistics, and the "shadow fleet", the law may significantly increase the economic cost of war for Moscow.
However, if tariffs predominantly turn into a matter of bilateral trade negotiations, and exceptions become rewards for concessions from the U.S. in other areas, the outcome for the Russian oil machine will be much more modest.
That is why after Trump’s signature, the key question has changed. Earlier it was: will Congress pass the "infernal sanctions"? Now the answer is known - it has passed, and the president signed it on September 18.
The question now is different: how close to 100% is the White House willing to turn the tariff regulator when it faces not Russia, but China and India.
Congress has charged the sanction gun. But the scope, trigger, and a significant part of the ammunition remain in Trump’s hands.