The European Commission insists: the return of Russian gas through 'Nord Stream' would contradict the EU's course towards energy independence from Moscow. Meanwhile, political discussions again raise a scenario where American investors could obtain a share in the pipeline infrastructure within the framework of a future peace settlement. This poses an uncomfortable question for Brussels: will European energy principles remain intact if the restoration of gas flows aligns with Washington's economic interests?
'Europe seeks to control the origin of gas. Washington may seek to control its route. But in any case, the final bill will be received by the European consumer.'
The pipeline that refuses to be buried
The history of 'Nord Stream' increasingly resembles a geopolitical storyline where economic logic constantly conflicts with political decisions.
Following the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, the European Union made reducing dependence on Russian energy sources one of its main strategic priorities. Pipelines that just recently symbolized the economic interdependence of Russia and Germany have become a symbol of the failure of previous European energy policy.
The explosions of 2022 damaged three of the four strings of the 'Nord Stream' system. One string of 'Nord Stream 2' remained physically intact, but that does not automatically allow for its commercial launch. Regulatory approvals, technical solutions, contracts, and political agreement are needed to restore supplies.
That is why the announced position of the spokesperson for the European Commission, Paula Pinho, regarding the impossibility of returning to Russian gas has not only political but also legal significance. Brussels seeks to make the abandonment of Russian energy sources a long-term norm rather than a temporary reaction to the war.
However, in international energy, final decisions are much less common than they seem from the tribunes of European institutions.
Reports of a potential interest from American capital in pipeline infrastructure open up a fundamentally different scenario: what will happen if Russian gas reaches Europe through an asset controlled or partially controlled by investors from the USA?
So far, such a scenario remains a matter of reports and assumptions, rather than a confirmed interstate agreement. Nevertheless, the mere possibility of such a construct demonstrates the complexity of future energy regulation.
American ownership does not change the origin of gas
At first glance, American involvement could change the political perception of 'Nord Stream'. The infrastructure that was associated with the Russian-German energy partnership would obtain a new influential participant - American capital.
For Washington, this could potentially mean an opportunity to influence the European gas market, generate income from the infrastructure, and use energy agreements as an instrument of broader diplomatic deals.
But here arises a fundamental legal problem.
Changing the ownership of the pipeline does not change the origin of the gas being transported through it.
If European restrictions specifically apply to the import of Russian gas, an American stake in the pipeline itself does not create a legal exception. It would be necessary to change the relevant rules or provide for a special mechanism for their application.
This is an important distinction between political fantasies about a future agreement and the actual architecture of European energy law.
The European Union has the authority to regulate access to energy resources on its own market regardless of the citizenship of the shareholders of the supplying company or the operator of the infrastructure. Therefore, American investment funds would not be granted automatic immunity from European restrictions.
Another question is how politically resilient Brussels would prove to be if the restoration of supplies became part of a broader agreement between Washington and Moscow.
The law that cannot be changed. For now, there is no need
The European Commission seeks to present the abandonment of Russian gas as a strategic choice that does not depend on short-term market fluctuations.
There is logic in this. Returning to the previous model of energy dependence could restore the political risks that Europe has been trying to eliminate since 2022.
At the same time, European legislation is not immutable.
If member states and European institutions reach a political agreement, the relevant rules can be revised. However, the notion that any ban can be lifted within a few hours at an evening summit does not take into account the complexity of legislative procedures, the competencies of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, as well as potential judicial challenges.
Political will can accelerate decisions, but it cannot always replace legal procedures.
Much more interesting is another: the European Union has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to change economic priorities under the pressure of extraordinary circumstances. The energy crisis, inflation, and threats to industrial competitiveness have forced governments to revise approaches that previously seemed inviolable.
Therefore, Brussels' future position will depend not only on legal formulations but also on what the price of gas will be, the state of European industry, and the nature of relations with the United States.
In European politics, principles are rarely openly canceled. Much more often, the circumstances under which they are allowed to be applied change.
Pipeline vs tanker: the paradox of European energy
The most vulnerable aspect of Brussels' argument remains the issue of Russian liquefied natural gas.
After a sharp reduction in pipeline supplies, Russian LNG continued to flow to European terminals, including in France, Belgium, and Spain. This created a politically awkward situation: Europe declared a gradual abandonment of Russian energy sources, but for some time maintained commercial channels for their procurement.
However, the assertion that the EU simply replaced cheap pipeline gas with the same resource at a threefold markup would be an excessive simplification.
The cost of LNG depends on global quotations, liquefaction costs, transportation, regasification, and contract conditions. The difference between pipeline and liquefied gas changes depending on market conditions.
Moreover, the import of Russian LNG and its transit through European ports were regulated by different restrictions. The EU gradually strengthened the rules in an effort to reduce even this channel of dependence.
However, the political contradiction does not disappear from this.
The European energy strategy simultaneously pursues three goals: to abandon Russian supplies, preserve affordable prices, and ensure stable supplies for industry.
Achieving all three simultaneously has proven to be more challenging than proclaiming them at a press conference.
Especially for energy-intensive industries in Germany, Italy, and other industrial economies, where the price of gas directly affects production competitiveness.
Washington sells pragmatism, Brussels - consistency
Possible American involvement in future 'Nord Stream' exposes a deeper distinction between the two approaches to energy security.
For the United States, energy infrastructure can be both a commercial asset, a tool of geopolitical influence, and part of a negotiation package.
For the European Commission, it increasingly pertains to regulation, strategic autonomy, and a reduction of dependence on states perceived as security threats.
Both positions have an economic underpinning.
American companies are interested in profitable energy projects, and the US has generally strengthened its role as a supplier of liquefied gas to Europe. Brussels, for its part, seeks to prevent a situation where a significant portion of European energy would again depend on political decisions of the Kremlin.
However, allied relationships do not eliminate commercial competition.
If American investors genuinely consider the possibility of participating in the reconstruction of the pipeline, Europe will find itself faced with a choice: defend the existing energy strategy even in the case of disagreements with Washington or seek a compromise that allows presenting a change of course as part of a new security system.
'For Washington, the pipeline can be an asset. For Brussels - a political principle. For European industry, it is primarily a question of the price of energy.'
Who will ultimately pay for the new energy reality?
The future of 'Nord Stream' depends on significantly more factors than a possible deal between American and Russian participants.
A technical assessment of the state of the infrastructure, ownership definition, regulatory approvals, commercial contracts, and political decisions of European states are needed. Even a potential peace settlement will not automatically mean the restoration of supplies.
Moreover, the European gas market has already changed. The role of LNG has increased, alternative routes have expanded, and governments have invested in infrastructure designed to reduce dependence on a single supplier.
Returning to the previous model would neither be simple nor guaranteed to be beneficial for all parties involved.
However, it cannot be ruled out that a change in the geopolitical situation will again make Russian pipeline gas a subject of economic negotiations. Especially if European producers continue to lose competitive positions due to high energy costs.
In the outlook to 2030, decisive will be not only political declarations but also several practical factors: global LNG supply, dynamics of European industrial demand, pace of renewable energy development, the nature of the sanctions regime, and future relations between the USA, EU, and Russia.
The main question is not whether Washington can force Brussels to open the pipeline. Such an outcome is not inevitable. Much more important is whether the European Union can maintain the independence of its energy decisions when the interests of its largest ally begin to contradict its own regulatory policy.
Europe has the right to abandon Russian gas. But strategic independence is measured not by the strictness of prohibitions, but by the ability to supply its economy with affordable energy without critical dependence on any external center of power.
And if one day 'Nord Stream' ends up back on the negotiating table, Brussels will face the main challenge not of rewriting the regulations but of demonstrating that European rules are determined by European interests.
After all, the most expensive energy policy is not necessarily the one where gas costs the most. Sometimes it is the policy where the continent pays for principles but gradually loses the ability to determine their price independently.