Russians were unable to capture Kyiv at the beginning of the invasion because they had too few forces. To compensate, they needed to destabilize the situation in Ukraine and deter the West from providing assistance, but they failed to do so. The war was planned not by the military but by the Russian secret services, which is another reason for the failures. Another factor is the excessive centralization in decision-making within the Russian army. If we manage to deliver a large-scale and crushing defeat to the Russians, their defense may crumble, and then we can liberate all territories. Crimea should be de-occupied before Donbas. This was stated in an interview with Gazeta.ua by Alexander Danilyuk, a corresponding member of the British Royal Institute for Defense and Security Studies.
You are the co-author of a study on the lessons of the war from February to July this year. It states that the Russians planned to capture Kyiv in 10 days and complete the occupation of Ukraine by August. Why did the plan fail?
In military terms, the Russians had no chance of achieving significant results at the first stage. If we analyze the capabilities of the armed forces of Ukraine and Russia at that time, they had insufficient strength for their stated objectives. The reason is not that the Russians are weak, but that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have significantly developed since 2014. They had the ability to stop the huge Russian army. This is what happened between February 24 and mid-June, when we moved on to planning the Kharkiv and Kherson operations.
The reason is also that when the plan of the Russian secret services to destabilize Ukraine failed, the military forces of the Russian Federation turned out to be insufficient to achieve the task of capturing the capital.
The Russians calculated that they would destabilize the situation and disable the system of state and military governance.
The Russians initially did not consider a purely military option to achieve their goals. They believed they could destabilize the situation and disable the system of state and military governance. They thought the military operation itself would pressure Ukraine, and the West would make concessions that would lead to destabilization. Alongside the beginning of the invasion, they actively held negotiations first in Belarus and then in Turkey.
The Russians decided that Kyiv and the West were bluffing. And if Moscow showed readiness to unleash a great war, then we would have to concede. This would again launch the process of destabilization.
It was hoped that the invasion itself would be sufficient to create destabilization to make Volodymyr Zelensky not just ready to make concessions, but to flee Kyiv. According to them, Ukrainians would perceive this as a betrayal of national interests, which would allow the Kremlin to claim the illegitimacy of the president.
How important was hierarchical and centralized decision-making in the initial failure of the Russian invasion, and the tendency to deceive the leadership in reports?
This is a significant element of their failure. There are two main shortcomings. Firstly, from the very beginning, the military component was auxiliary. The operation itself was conducted by the secret services. They planned it. This is a characteristic feature of most Soviet and Russian operations.
As long as the operation was more special than military, the leadership of the secret services justified itself. When transitioning to full-scale war mode, the overlay through intelligence and the FSB became a barrier. These people think differently than the military. They are trained to perform different tasks.
Within the Russian army itself, the Soviet culture of relationships between commanders and subordinates at all levels remains. There is a very high level of centralization.
The approaches are completely opposite in most NATO countries' armies and in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Over the past nine years, we have managed to change the culture of the Ukrainian army by supporting grassroots initiatives and a high level of autonomy for commanders on the ground. They are more flexible and respond better to constantly changing situations. Russian commanders act not just schematically but strictly according to the orders given. Even if the operational situation does not correspond to what was considered during planning.
According to directives from Russian commanders, it was expected there would be small pockets of resistance that they should bypass.
That is why, in the first few days, they suffered great losses. First of all, they encountered colossal resistance. According to directives, Russian commanders predicted there would be small pockets of resistance to bypass. They did not rely on organized systemic resistance from the troops. Despite seeing that the situation was fundamentally different from what was planned, they acted according to directives. They tried to reach the boundaries defined in their documents.
If, for example, we recall the group moving on the left side of the Dnieper toward Kyiv. Despite it being clear that their logistics were broken, they pushed themselves into an operational encirclement, and they stubbornly continued to move. They almost entered the Kyiv district of Darnytsia, fighting occurred in the suburbs of the capital. Although there was no strategic logic in these actions.
Now, in the tenth month of the war, have they changed their centralized approach?
Given that the Russian Federation is not a military dictatorship but a Chekist one, this element is inevitably unchanged. This is the philosophy of Putin and his close circle of old KGB officers running the country. It does not matter what role the 5th service of the FSB plays in managing the war. It is unlikely to be high, but the top makes the main decisions. If we look at the senseless throwing of Russians into the meat grinder near Bakhmut, there is no sense in this from a military standpoint.
Immediate planning of operations is done by the military, but determining tasks and priorities is done by those far from military affairs. These people have different objectives. What Russian propaganda tells on television about the capture of Bakhmut 'turning the tide of the war,' and about 'strategically important settlements' is absolute nonsense.
Москва движется к усилению авторитаризма, а затем к еще большей централизации принятия решений.
Regarding the culture of centralized decision-making, I doubt that the Russians are capable of changing it in a short period of time. This is a common trait of all authoritarian societies. Moscow is moving towards strengthening authoritarianism and then towards even greater centralization of decision-making.
In such a trend, it is impossible for the army to start stimulating the initiative of officers and give them a high level of autonomy.
Кто из российских военных отказывался выполнять нелепые приказы, раздевали и привязывали на крышах домов, чтобы весь день жарились под палящим солнцем.
In addition, these living waves of 'cannon fodder,' when they drive massive amounts of dying infantry, are methods of warfare by the Soviet commander Georgy Zhukov. They are incompatible with a high level of initiative and autonomy of officers. It would be more likely that the Russians will soon have 'blocking detachments' than anything else.
One of the motivational tools for the Russian military today is brutal illegal punishments. Intimidation, detention in basements. In the summer, those who refused to follow absurd orders were stripped and tied to rooftops to roast all day in the blazing sun. I won't even mention executions.
What is Russia's current strategic goal?
The short-term task is to freeze the conflict within the boundaries of the occupied territories they currently hold.
They allow for the possibility that they may lose certain lands that Ukraine will liberate. They have certain leeway regarding concessions. By how they are building their defense lines, we can conclude that they have the first option of holding everything that is currently occupied. The second is to retreat to the line of February 24. The third is to give up Donbas but remain in Crimea. Their actions regarding organizing defense, mobilization, public and non-public diplomacy are subordinate to this.
To achieve this, they will not hesitate to sit back in defense in Crimea, southern Ukraine, and Donbas. They will create conditions in which Ukraine will seem to be on the brink of defeat. They want to return to the situation in March when Russian tanks stood at the approaches to Kyiv, and our troops were retreating to the north. Their plans include a demonstration of Russian forces: if they cannot win the war, then to change its course.
The goal is to force the West and Ukraine to recognize a new status quo favorable for the Russians.
There are talks of a possible offensive at the end of January - early February, as warned by the Ukrainian leadership?
I completely agree with the assessment of Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny that at the end of January - beginning of February, the Russians may attempt to go on the offensive. The timing depends not so much on the readiness of the new Russian units that are already being formed and trained, but on the overall political situation - increasing pressure through new possible invasions. The goal is to force the West and Ukraine to recognize a new status quo favorable to the Russians. Then Putin can present this to the Russian society as a victory.
We should prepare more effectively than we did on February 24.
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What exactly is being referred to?
First of all, we should better prepare additional reserves, territorial defense units, deploy them in advance, and set up positions. If this had been done last February, the Russians would have had nothing to withdraw and redeploy to Donbas. Secondly, they could have been stopped much further from large cities like Kyiv and Chernihiv. Of course, it is difficult to stop them away from Sumy and Kharkiv because they are on the border, and the Russians are shelling them from their territory. Thirdly, long Russian columns are largely defenseless. They could have been destroyed to the ground if we had prepared better.
There is a serious preparation going on among the Russians for increasing the scale of the war.
We see that there is serious preparation among the Russians for increasing the scale of the war. Putin is preparing for a broad escalation. In this situation, Ukraine needs modern weapons that will help mitigate the Russian advantage in numbers.
What is needed to defeat the Russians?
Our situation resembles the Cold War times when the Warsaw Pact countries had a numerical advantage in manpower and armored vehicles over NATO troops in Europe. Since the 1970s, the Alliance developed a special strategy on how to act. It's similar to what we have now. When there is a large concentration of enemy manpower and equipment, technological superiority is precisely what is required. For instance, ATACMS missiles that can strike targets up to 300 km away. We are in urgent need of them. Talks about being able to use them against targets within the Russian Federation are nonsense. This is modern weaponry. If partners want, they can simply restrict the ability to launch coordinates within Ukraine's territory.
The situation where we do not fight with Western weapons against Russia and Belarus is interesting as long as we have our own forces and means to defeat the enemy's territory.
The situation where we do not fight with Western weapons against Russia and Belarus is interesting as long as we still have our own forces and means to defeat the enemy's territory. Otherwise, the Russians will shell us from their territory, in particular with artillery, and we will be unable to respond.
We also need an advantage in the air. Western planes and combat helicopters are urgently needed. All this allows for attacking stretched advancing columns. This is a better option than waiting for them to reach certain lines in Ukraine and begin to deploy. While they are moving, they are more vulnerable.
If we have everything necessary, by February we will be able to deliver them fire damage from missiles and planes. This would also allow us to redeploy airborne assault troops to deliver strikes from flanks and rear, to carry out operational encirclements, operations against hostile logistics. This would enable larger force raids.
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With the possible acquisition of American Patriot missile defense systems in the near future, there is hope that other weapons from Western partners will also arrive.
There is hope. Russian missile strikes against our infrastructure are part of their overall strategy to force the conflict to freeze on Russia's terms.
These attacks are a significant tool of influence on our exhausted society, on the economy, and on Europe. If the strikes do not lead to an additional wave of refugees, they have significantly slowed or stopped the return of Ukrainians home. In the summer, Ukrainians had already begun returning actively. This is an additional financial burden on Europeans. It also serves as an additional financial lever against Western partners, as they are forced to assist Ukraine more since our economy is unable to independently support the needs of Ukrainians.
Ukrainian air defense systems and modern Western ones are intercepting an increasing share of Russian missiles and kamikaze drones.
Ukrainian air defense systems and modern Western ones are intercepting an increasing share of Russian missiles and kamikaze drones. However, it is not only difficult and costly for the Russians to produce modern missiles. It is also expensive and time-consuming for Western partners to make missiles for these air defense systems. Using a $20,000 missile against $100,000 or million-dollar drones is economically unreasonable. The Russians are counting on this.
What to expect from a possible new Russian offensive?
It will end very badly for them. Perhaps afterwards, for a long time they will be unable to conduct large ground operations at all. Once they abandon them, they may be able to inflict missile strikes against Ukraine almost indefinitely. Their intensity might be low. But living next to a warring Russian regime and developing the country will be a challenging task.
For Putin, the war is his path to preserving the regime.
For Putin, the war is his pathway to regime preservation. Therefore, our strategic goal is the change of the Putin regime in Russia to any one that will not wage war against us. This is necessary to establish a sustainable peace with the Russians. It can only be achieved based on Russia's recognition of Ukraine's borders as of 1991. Russia has recognized these borders many times, as documented in several inter-state and international agreements.
We should not count on the Russians running out of missiles in two or three weeks and being unable to strike at us.
We must understand that Russia does not plan to collapse tomorrow. Unfortunately, the Russians are still not in a state of deep internal crisis. However, in the prospect of 3-4 years, such processes are inevitable. Our task is to win the war faster.
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You mentioned that the Russians may still strike our territory with missiles for a long time. On December 5, Ukraine struck at two airfields deep inside Russia. Can we retaliate against the Russians by destroying the launch points of the missiles?
We have the capabilities to strike at sufficiently long ranges to deliver such strikes. We have tactics to effectively employ them at any strategic depth of the Russian Federation.
There are no places on the territory of Russia that we could not hit. The other question is that for now, we cannot deliver large-scale attacks against a large number of targets. The Russians cannot intercept these strikes.
And this weakens the Russians' ability to strike at us.
First of all, a correct definition of objectives is needed. If we talk about priorities, they are airfields, depots, important objects of their military infrastructure. I would also consider their defense-industrial complex enterprises, particularly those that produce missiles.
Russian troops will be encircled and trapped.
You said that the war could drag on for a long time. However, the head of Ukrainian intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, said that by the summer of 2023, the Armed Forces of Ukraine could reach the borders of Crimea. American General Ben Hodges stated that by the end of August, the de-occupation of the peninsula might be finished. How could this happen?
In regard to the possibility of the Armed Forces of Ukraine liberating the entire territory of Ukraine - if the Russians suffer a devastating defeat in the large-scale offensive they are planning for February, a collapse of Russian ground forces may occur. In that case, we will see a situation similar to that in Kherson or Kharkiv. The Russians will be forced to retreat because they will not have enough strength to hold their positions. There will be significant threats that their forces will become encircled and trapped.
From a military and political perspective, it is more correct to start with the liberation of Crimea rather than Donbas.
In such circumstances, the liberation of Crimea could occur. From a military and political perspective, it is more correct to begin with the liberation of Crimea rather than Donbas. There are two arguments in favor of this. The first is that the Russians have prepared serious engineering and fortification defensive positions in Donbas over nine years, and they will unlikely be able to do this rapidly in Crimea. There are landscape nuances, but they are not critical. The second point is that if we liberate Crimea, the Russians will have no reason to offer strong resistance in Donbas. It will also be difficult for them to argue on the international stage that Crimea is different.