Threat of Attacks on Water Infrastructure
An analysis examines the risk that Russia may target water supply systems in Ukraine's largest cities, including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Odesa. On March 25, 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that the Kremlin is planning operations against Ukraine's water infrastructure. By April 3, he further warned that Russian forces would strike water supply networks, bridges, dams, and pumping stations. These developments raise serious concerns about the potential impact on essential services for millions of residents in these major urban centers.
Experts suggest that a complete loss of water in these cities is unlikely, but temporary disruptions are possible, especially due to attacks on the energy grid. For instance, water outages in Kyiv resulting from damage to power facilities could last up to two days, while in Odesa, residents might face up to five days without water. In Kharkiv, the local water utility is already grappling with financial difficulties, compounding the challenge.
Preparing for Potential Attacks
Mykolaiv has already experienced the loss of its primary water source. However, according to experts, wells and alternative water points in the city become operational within 4 to 6 hours after the central system shuts down. In the Odesa region, there are 2,329 water supply and drainage facilities, of which 2,215 (95.1%) have backup power sources. Among 226 pumping stations and treatment plants, 219 (96.9%) are equipped with backup power, and 1,996 out of 2,103 artesian wells and water towers (94.9%) also have backup electricity.
Specialists advise city residents to prepare for possible water supply interruptions. Stanislav Ihnatiev stated:
“The enemy will try to leave Kyiv without water, and every Kyiv resident must prepare for this.”Serhiy Nahorniak emphasized that Russian forces could disrupt water supply and drainage in major cities. Mykyta Poturayev expressed concern, warning that 'if you leave the studio and find frozen sewage instead of drinking water in the taps, you won't care about discussing issues.'
In light of potential attacks, experts recommend several preparatory measures:
- Develop artesian well systems;
- Create autonomous water supply zones on the right and left banks separately;
- Drill wells near hospitals, bakeries, and boiler houses, equipping them with independent purification systems and generators.
Dmytro Novytskyi noted that
“the panic sown by certain deputies is irresponsible,”and “the main mistake is viewing water supply and drainage facilities as fragile.”
Given these challenges, public information campaigns are crucial. Every household should maintain a permanent water reserve for 3 to 5 days. Drawing from Mykolaiv's experience, the assumption that large cities cannot be left without water is flawed. Oleh Popenko stressed that it is physically impossible to completely paralyze water supply:
“To stop water from reaching the taps, the Russians would need to hit sewage pumping stations, of which there are a huge number across Kyiv.”
Thus, the threat of attacks on water supply systems in Ukrainian cities is real, and appropriate preparatory measures can help mitigate risks to the population.
In this context, effective cooperation between authorities and the public is essential to ensure water supply security. Efficient resource management and readiness for potential emergencies could be key factors in maintaining stability in Ukraine's largest cities. Drawing on lessons from other municipalities, analysts underscore the need for strategic planning and the development of alternative water sources to prevent crises.