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Orbán’s Government Spent Years Blocking the Expulsion of a Russian Spy

Уряд Орбана роками затримував вислання російського шпигуна. Photo: ХВИЛЯ

Russian Intelligence Officer Artur Sushkov Finally Expelled

For years, Viktor Orbán’s administration prevented the removal of Russian intelligence officer Artur Sushkov, who operated under diplomatic cover in Budapest. The expulsion only became possible after Orbán lost the election on April 12, 2026. Sushkov, a 36-year-old third secretary at Russia’s embassy in Hungary, was identified by Hungarian security services as an officer of the SVR (Russia’s foreign intelligence service). Along with his wife Svetlana, he left the country on May 4, 2026.

Counterintelligence had demanded Sushkov’s expulsion as early as February 2026, but Orbán’s government blocked the operation. During the election campaign, Moscow actively supported Orbán’s reelection bid, which may have influenced the government’s decision on the expulsion. As expert Péter Buda notes,

“similar situations occurred repeatedly under Orbán’s government,”
pointing out that
“political leadership did not allow intelligence services to do their job properly.”

Sushkov’s Activities and Areas of Interest

Sushkov focused on think tanks and academic institutions, including:

  • Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC)
  • Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA)
  • John Lukacs Institute of Strategy and Policy at Ludovika University of Public Service

All three institutions were overseen by Balázs Orbán, the prime minister’s political director. The spy had already begun recruiting at least three individuals, one of whom was a researcher with connections to HIIA and the Lukacs Institute.

Sushkov’s interests included political gossip, data on the Paks-2 nuclear power plant project, and the password for HIIA’s internal Wi-Fi network. He also actively studied Budapest’s plans regarding Ukraine. As Péter Buda emphasized,

“we should not be naive: a country where one does not fear serious consequences is an attractive platform for hostile intelligence services.”

Notably, at least a dozen identified or suspected SVR officers remain at Russia’s embassy in Budapest. During the election campaign, the GRU (Russian military intelligence) sent three additional agents to Hungary, specializing in social media manipulation. According to Buda,

“Russian intelligence activities in Hungary were not necessarily directed solely against Hungarian targets—they also targeted other Schengen Area countries.”
In the expert’s view,
“Orbán’s government at least indirectly contributed to the success of this war.”

The expulsion of Artur Sushkov may signal a shift in the Hungarian government’s approach to Russian intelligence following the elections, which brought political change. This could open new opportunities for Hungarian security services to cooperate with Western partners, as security and countering external threats remain pressing issues. However, with growing Russian activity in the region, it is important to monitor Hungary’s next steps in this area.

The recent expulsion of Artur Sushkov marks a significant shift in Hungary's intelligence approach, especially following Orbán's electoral defeat. This change opens the door for a reevaluation of Hungary's foreign policy, particularly its stance on Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. For a deeper understanding of how these developments might reshape Hungary's international relations, read more about the implications of Orban's recent defeat and its impact on support for Ukraine.