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Key Strategic Errors by Both Sides in Russia’s War Against Ukraine, According to Analysts

Аналіз основних помилок стратегій обох сторін у конфлікті між Росією та Україною на думку експертів. Photo: ХВИЛЯ

Book Discussion: 'Everybody Loses'

In a recent interview, Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation specializing in Russia and Eurasia policy, sat down with Michael Kimmage, director of the Kennan Institute, to talk about his book Everybody Loses. Co-authored with Harvard scholar Timothy Colton, the book examines the early phase of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which first erupted in 2014. It delves into the Minsk agreements, the factors that led to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the miscalculations made by all parties involved.

The Minsk Accords and Their Impact

The first Minsk agreement was signed in September 2014, followed by Minsk II in February 2015 after lengthy negotiations. Charap explains,

“We wanted to trace the origins of what could be called the first version of the Russia-Ukraine war—a conflict that truly began in 2014.”

In the years that followed, relations between Ukraine and Russia grew increasingly strained. Key moments included Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to flee the country in early 2014 and Vladimir Putin’s choice to launch a full-scale invasion in late 2021.

Charap also highlights what he calls Russia’s long-standing imperial drive toward its neighbors, particularly Ukraine, which has been evident since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. He notes that by the time the war escalated in 2022, “very little of that connective tissue—those shared interests that once tied Russia to the United States—remained.” Reflecting on earlier assumptions, Charap says, “The thinking, however naive it sounds now, was that Ukraine’s chances of achieving European integration or NATO membership with an unhealed wound in the east were considered very low.”

He also analyzes the role of international diplomacy, pointing to the “stable and predictable” approach the Biden administration used in its dealings with Russia. Charap emphasizes that “opportunities for third-party mediation in the current war do exist, but if Russia genuinely wanted to end it, it could be doing far more to make that happen—and it isn’t.”

Additionally, he addresses Russia’s persistent misunderstandings about Ukraine, stating, “This is a blind spot in the Russian view of Ukraine—a failure to grasp that linguistic preferences don’t align neatly with political ones.” Charap believes that “Russians are painfully coming to terms with a new reality: they will have to accept a hostile Ukraine on their border—if not forever, then for at least a generation.”

Overall, the interview with Samuel Charap sheds light on the complex nature of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, its roots, and its far-reaching consequences. In his view, these consequences will likely be long-lasting for all sides involved.

Charap’s discussion underscores the importance of understanding the historical and political contexts that shape modern relations between Ukraine and Russia. Studying past events and their impact on current conflicts is essential for developing strategies that could help bring peace to the region. His analysis offers valuable insights for policymakers and analysts seeking ways to resolve this intricate conflict.

As the conflict continues to evolve, analysts are drawing parallels between the current situation in Ukraine and historical conflicts, suggesting that a Korean-style stalemate may be emerging. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for grasping the potential future scenarios in the region and the implications of ongoing strategic miscalculations by both sides.