Deconstructing Russia's War on Ukraine
In a conversation with Michael Kimmage, Timothy Snyder examines the origins of Russia's conflict with Ukraine. He traces the Ukrainian national idea back to the Cossack era, stressing that the war was triggered by Russian perceptions of Ukraine as illegitimate, not by Ukrainian actions. Snyder criticizes Western nations for adopting a Russian imperial framework of history, which led them to underestimate Ukraine's ability to resist in 2022. He also highlights three instances of Soviet historical rewriting that framed the past as Russian, explains why the Bolsheviks pragmatically recognized Ukraine's existence, and discusses Belarus's role.
The Historical Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity
Snyder, who chairs the Department of Modern European History at the University of Toronto, notes that Ukraine's national history begins with the Cossack era, spanning from the mid-17th to the late 18th century.
“So, when we talk about national history, the starting point for Ukraine is not the 19th century, but the 17th,” he asserts.Before 1918, the dominant idea among Ukrainians in central and eastern Ukraine was federalist, and Mykhailo Hrushevsky—who served as the head of the Ukrainian People's Republic's parliament—played a key role in shaping national identity.
Snyder also underscores the importance of historical understanding, stating:
“Essentially, we all learned history through a Russian imperial lens, where everything important is somehow tied to Moscow or St. Petersburg, and everything else is just the periphery.”He argues that the Soviet regime recognized Ukraine not as a gift but out of pragmatism, because 'Bolshevik leaders had to include a Ukrainian republic if they wanted the Soviet Union to have any chance of survival.'
Russia's invasion of Ukraine began in 2014, with a full-scale assault launching in 2022. Snyder emphasizes that the West underestimated Ukraine's capacity to resist because 'we took it for granted that Russia was real and Ukraine was not.' This led to serious miscalculations about Ukrainians' ability to defend their territory. He also points out that more civilians have died in Ukraine than in Russia during World War II, even though Russia is a much larger country.
Discussing Belarus, Snyder notes that 'the most dangerous place in the world during World War II was Belarus.' He also believes that 'Lukashenko's grip on power is quite shaky,' and if Putin falls, Lukashenko will likely follow soon after.
Snyder concluded the interview by stating that the Ukrainian national movement is not a reaction to Russia but rather a form of political choice, illustrating its complex history and desire for independence.
Snyder's analysis underscores the need to understand Ukrainian history in the context of the current war, as perceptions of national identity can significantly influence political decisions and international support. His remarks about Western underestimation of Ukraine's resilience also highlight the necessity of rethinking security and foreign policy approaches amid a shifting geopolitical landscape. As Snyder suggests, Ukraine's history is a multifaceted phenomenon requiring deeper examination to adequately respond to today's challenges.
In light of Snyder's insights into Ukraine's historical context, it's essential to explore how this legacy shapes the current geopolitical landscape. As he notes, Ukraine's role is not merely a byproduct of external influences but a crucial player in its own right. For a deeper understanding of this dynamic, consider how Ukraine embodies NATO's strategic vision in its ongoing struggle.