In 1944, Churchill and Stalin recorded the spheres of influence in Eastern Europe in percentages. Eighty-two years later, Trump and Xi Jinping discuss Ukraine at the same table as Taiwan, tariffs, rare earth metals, and artificial intelligence. However, the historical analogy has its limits: the fact of a great bargain is evident, but there is no evidence that Washington and Beijing are already dividing Ukraine into 'percentages of influence.'
In October 1944, Winston Churchill slid a small sheet of paper to Joseph Stalin. Handwritten on it were figures: Romania - 90% Soviet influence, Greece - 90% British influence, Yugoslavia and Hungary - 50-50. Stalin took a blue pencil, marked a check, and returned the paper to Churchill. Thus, one of the most famous symbols of great power diplomacy was born - the so-called 'percent agreement.'
In a few minutes, the two men tried to describe the future political architecture of part of Europe in a few figures.
After 82 years, the paper has changed, pencils have become digital, and negotiation rooms are filled with advisors, lawyers, and economists. Yet the temptation of a great power to reduce the complex world to a table of mutual concessions has not disappeared.
During the meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Washington on September 24, Ukraine was indeed on the table. The official Chinese report formulated it almost demonstratively dryly: the leaders 'exchanged views' regarding the situation in the Middle East, the Ukrainian crisis, and the Korean Peninsula. Beijing did not disclose any details.
This brevity is interesting not because it proves the existence of a secret agreement. It does not prove anything of the sort. What is interesting is that Ukraine is now part of a much larger American-Chinese conversation.
One Table, Many Bills
The Washington summit did not resemble one large agreement, but rather the accounting ledger of superpowers.
Trade. Tariffs. Rare earth metals. Artificial Intelligence. Taiwan. The Middle East. Ukraine. Military communication channels.
On the eve of the meeting, China and the US continued to maintain a trade ceasefire. Rare earth metals remained one of Beijing's main levers: Chinese companies control over 90% of the world's processing capacity for rare earth elements, according to data quoted by The Washington Post citing the International Energy Agency. The US, in turn, has its own lever - tariffs and restrictions on China's access to advanced computing technologies.
Xi separately raised the issue of Taiwan and urged Washington to handle it cautiously. Artificial intelligence also became part of the negotiations: the sides later agreed to create a channel to respond to incidents related to AI and to continue work on military crisis communication mechanisms.
And somewhere within this vast matrix was Ukraine.
This is what matters, not the number of words in the press release.
The Birth of G2 - for Now Without a Sign
It would be premature to announce the emergence of a formal G2 - a world governed jointly by Washington and Beijing. The US has allies in Europe and Asia; China has its own partnerships; India, the EU, Japan, and other major power centers are not about to voluntarily become mere extras.
Nevertheless, the structure of Trump and Xi's negotiations increasingly resembles a dialogue between two systemic states capable of negotiating across multiple regions and sectors simultaneously.
In such diplomacy, there are almost no isolated issues.
Washington seeks stable supplies of critical minerals - Beijing needs access to the American market. China wants restrictions on American support for Taiwan - the US wants to reduce the risk of military escalation in the Pacific. American technological restrictions hit Chinese ambitions in semiconductors - Chinese control over a portion of critical raw materials creates problems for American industry.
Ukraine enters this system not because it will necessarily be 'exchanged' for Taiwan or microchips. There is no public evidence of such a direct exchange.
It enters because China has levers of influence over Russia, while the US has levers of influence over Ukraine and the European security system.
This is why Volodymyr Zelensky asked Trump before the summit to engage Xi in diplomatic efforts and to use Beijing's influence on Moscow. After the meeting, he told reporters that he had not yet received information from the White House regarding the outcome of this part of the negotiations.
This is a small detail with significant meaning. Kyiv itself considers Beijing a potential element of the negotiating structure.
Not Yalta. For Now
It is here that the historical analogy with Churchill and Stalin becomes dangerously alluring.
In 1944, Europe was militarily exhausted, the Red Army was advancing west, and Britain was trying to retain the remnants of its influence in the Mediterranean. The percentages on paper were an attempt to formalize the balance of power that was already being shaped on the battlefield.
Today, the situation is fundamentally different.
China does not control Russia. The US cannot unilaterally determine Ukraine's decisions. European states have their own armies, budgets, and political interests. And the war continues, so any diplomatic structure depends not only on agreements in Washington or Beijing but also on what is happening at the front.
Even the famous 'percent agreement' of 1944 was less magical than it seems in retrospect. One checkmark by Stalin did not create post-war Eastern Europe. It was largely created by the armies that physically found themselves in the respective territories.
This rule has not gone anywhere.
The negotiating map always overlays the power map.
The Big Accounting
But that is why the absence of a separate American-Chinese memorandum on Ukraine does not signify either a breakthrough or a failure.
The public results of the summit were overall modest compared to its ceremonial scale. The Associated Press characterized the meeting as rich in symbolism but limited in substantial breakthroughs. The most notable outcome was the continuation of the trade ceasefire; at the same time, the leaders did indeed discuss Ukraine, Iran, AI, and Taiwan.
This resembles not a finished contract, but rather the beginning of a complex table.
If Washington truly wants to involve Beijing in Ukrainian resolution, American negotiators need to understand what China is willing to do regarding Moscow - and what it will want in return. If Beijing seeks American concessions in trade, technology, or around Taiwan, Washington will assess what price it is willing to pay and what China is actually capable of giving.
This does not mean that there is a direct exchange rate of 'Ukraine for Taiwan' or 'Donbas for rare earth metals.' Great diplomacy rarely operates so primitively.
It works through parallel concessions.
One side does not change its position here. The other becomes more accommodating there. One tariff is postponed. One export license is issued. One shipment of arms is sped up or slowed down. One state persuades its partner to sit at the table. Formally, each decision has its own explanation. Together they can form a balance.
This is what geopolitical accounting looks like.
Where the Modern Napkin Lies
For now, we know only one important thing: the Ukrainian war is already present in the highest American-Chinese dialogue. The official Chinese report confirms this directly. We do not know what specific proposals Trump and Xi discussed, whether they were concrete, and whether they were tied to other issues.
Therefore, to say that 'the percentages of influence have already been calculated' would be beautiful literature but so far weak intelligence.
However, the very architecture of the negotiations is worth attention. When Ukraine, Taiwan, rare earth metals, tariffs, AI, and the Middle East appear on the agenda of one meeting of the two most powerful states in the world, the boundaries between regional crises begin to blur.
In 1944, Churchill needed half a sheet of paper.
In 2026, the table is much more complex: it includes tariffs, chips, minerals, missiles, Taiwan, Moscow, and Kyiv. And so far, there is no evidence that anyone has already ascribed a final percentage to Ukraine.
We have not yet seen the modern 'Churchill napkin.' But Ukraine has already found itself in the same negotiation folder where great powers count significantly more than territories.