Ukraine is capable of continuing its defense for several more years, but the economic cost of each subsequent year of war will rise. Economist Danilo Monin warns of the risks of financial dependency, destruction of industry, and post-war devaluation. At the same time, he is convinced that if the war can be stopped, the likelihood of its resumption will be low. His main conclusion is that the military resilience of the state does not mean limitless resilience of its economy.
The Ukrainian economy has demonstrated the ability to adapt to circumstances that seemed incompatible with the normal functioning of the state just a few years ago. Enterprises are changing logistics, energy workers are restoring damaged networks, and the budget continues to finance defense and social obligations.
However, behind this resilience lies an increasingly complex economic structure. A significant part of state expenditures depends on external assistance, industrial potential is suffering losses, and the needs of the defense sector are growing faster than the capabilities of the national economy.
In an interview dedicated to the economic and geopolitical prospects of Ukraine, economist Danilo Monin expressed the opinion that the main limitation for prolonged warfare may not only be human resources or the situation at the front but also the financial capacity of the state.
«Ukraine's resilience for several years of warfare exists. It just requires an increasingly larger amount of money», noted the economist.
An Economy That Has Learned to Survive but Not to Recover
One of the biggest problems Monin cites is the gradual reduction of civilian production. Russian strikes on industrial enterprises, warehouses, energy facilities, and transport infrastructure do not necessarily cause an immediate economic collapse. However, they weaken the country's ability to generate added value independently.
The economist considers replacing domestic production with imports to be particularly dangerous. The state may continue to receive revenue from VAT, but an increasingly larger share of these revenues is formed by imported goods rather than products of Ukrainian enterprises.
This allows for maintaining budget indicators while worsening the trade balance and increasing the need for foreign currency.
According to estimates provided by Monin, Ukraine's trade deficit could approach $80 billion. These figures are his interpretation of economic trends and need to be compared with current statistics from the National Bank.
At the same time, the Ukrainian economy has not lost the ability to adapt. The agricultural sector remains an important source of export revenues, the defense industry is ramping up production, and enterprises are finding alternative supply routes.
However, adaptation to destruction and recovery of economic potential are different processes. The first allows survival through the next blow. The second creates a foundation for future growth.
Financial Arithmetic of 2027
The economist pays special attention to the growing needs of Ukraine for international funding.
According to his estimates, if in 2023–2024 annual needs for external funds amounted to about $40 billion, by 2025 they exceeded $50 billion. In the following years, the burden may increase significantly more.
Monin assumes that the financial needs of the state in 2027 could reach approximately $91 billion, and if defensive programs are expanded, could grow even more.
These are forecast estimates from the interviewee and not a confirmed final amount of the budget deficit.
The main problem lies not only in finding funding for one budget year. Ukraine is gradually transitioning to a model where each subsequent year of war may require more external financing than the previous one.
«And who, excuse me, will give even more money to Ukraine and under what conditions?» poses Monin when discussing the prospects for 2028–2029.
This question is fundamentally important. Grants, concessional loans, and other financial instruments impact the future of state finances differently. Non-repayable assistance supports the budget without increasing debt obligations. Loans provide current liquidity but may create additional burdens in the future.
Ukraine may have enough resources to continue its defense today, but at the same time, accumulate economic problems that will need to be addressed after the fighting ends.
The Russian Economy: Why Rapid Depletion May Not Occur
Monin is skeptical about expectations of a rapid economic collapse in Russia.
In his view, despite sanctions, budget deficits, and losses from Ukrainian strikes on oil refining infrastructure, the Russian economy retains significant resources for financing the war.
The economist points out the relatively low state debt of the Russian Federation, revenues from energy exports, and the ability to alter the structure of military expenditures.
At the same time, these arguments do not mean there are no economic problems in Russia. Inflation, labor shortages, sanctions restrictions, high borrowing costs, and an increasing dependence of the industry on state military orders create long-term risks.
Monin believes that the Russian leadership can theoretically reduce expenses on ground offensive operations while maintaining the intensity of missile and drone strikes.
This scenario does not guarantee strategic success for Moscow; however, it demonstrates the complexity of economically depleting an opponent that possesses significant resources.
At the same time, the assertion that Russia is guaranteed to wage war for another ten years remains an assumption. Real capabilities will depend on oil prices, sanctions, domestic politics, and the nature of combat operations.
The Heaviest Bill Will Arrive After the War
Monin sees a separate danger in the post-war period.
The ending of hostilities will not mean an automatic return of the economy to normal functioning. On the contrary, the state will simultaneously face the necessity to restore infrastructure, finance social programs, support veterans, return people to the labor market, and attract private investments.
Meanwhile, international assistance may gradually change its nature: instead of financing current budget needs, partners may increasingly focus on reconstruction and investment projects.
Monin warns that without sufficient recovery of exports and domestic production, this will create risks of devaluation of the hryvnia.
In the interview, he even suggests the possibility of an exchange rate of around 100 hryvnias per dollar in an unfavorable scenario. However, this figure is not an established forecast: the exchange rate will depend on the reserves of the National Bank, the volumes of international support, inflation, exports, and the speed of economic recovery.
No less serious problem remains demographics. Prolonged migration, a shrinking working-age population, and the destruction of economic centers may complicate recovery even when funding is available.
In such a situation, post-war reconstruction will require not just rebuilding destroyed facilities but also a rethinking of the economic geography of the country.
Peace Negotiations as an Economic Calculation
Considering these risks, Monin advocates for intensifying diplomatic efforts to end the fighting.
He believes that negotiations should not automatically be equated with capitulation, and the economic consequences of prolonging the war must be taken into account alongside military and security factors.
At the same time, the economic viability of ending hostilities does not guarantee sustainable peace. Without reliable security guarantees, control mechanisms, and Ukraine's ability to defend itself, a ceasefire may turn into a temporary pause before new aggression.
However, Monin assesses the risk of a repeated large-scale invasion much more conservatively. In his opinion, if the fighting can be stopped, the likelihood of a new large-scale conflict will be low.
«I believe that if the war can be stopped, then its resumption is unlikely», emphasizes the economist.
Thus, Monin views the cessation of hostilities not only as an opportunity to reduce current economic losses but also as a chance to move towards the long-term recovery of the country without the inevitable prospect of a new large-scale war.
In this logic, ending the war could create conditions for the return of investments, gradual recovery of production, and a reduction in the dependence of the state budget on external assistance. Indeed, even in the presence of significant international resources, economic growth requires predictability, which is difficult to achieve amid constant fighting.
At the same time, such an assessment remains the economist’s forecast, not a guarantee of security. Its realization will depend on the conditions of any potential settlement, the military potential of the parties, and the ability of international partners to ensure compliance with the agreements.
This is where the boundary lies between economic calculation and strategic security.
Monin also positively assesses the potential for American investments in the extraction of Ukrainian mineral resources, including gas and critically important minerals. In his view, large foreign investments could not only create jobs, but also enhance international interest in Ukraine's stability.
The economic presence of American business, according to this logic, could become an additional factor in deterring future aggression. However, its effectiveness will depend on the scale of investments, political commitments of partners, and the overall security architecture. Commercial interests can strengthen international interest in peace, although they do not in themselves replace military deterrent mechanisms.
The Ukrainian Paradox: The Front May Hold Out Longer Than the Economy
The main contradiction that the economist points out is that military and economic resilience may evolve along different trajectories.
The Ukrainian army adapts to technological changes, expands the use of drones and robotic systems, and the defense industry gradually increases its capabilities.
At the same time, the civilian economy suffers losses, the demographic potential is shrinking, and dependence on international partners remains significant.
Monin does not predict an inevitable collapse of the front. On the contrary, he believes that Ukraine is capable of holding its defense for a long time. His concern mainly concerns the economic price of such a scenario.
«The longer the war lasts, the harder it will be to exit the economic crisis», sums up the economist.
At the same time, his position is based on the assumption that the cessation of fighting does not necessarily lead to a new cycle of war. This is why Monin considers diplomatic settlement potentially more beneficial for Ukraine's long-term economic prospects than continuing the exhausting confrontation indefinitely.
However, this does not imply that Ukraine should agree to any terms for ending the war. Economic losses must be weighed against the risks of new aggression, possible territorial concessions, and long-term consequences for the state’s independence.
2027 may not be a moment of economic collapse but rather a test of Ukraine's and its partners’ ability to transform short-term war funding into a long-term survival and recovery strategy.
The key question is no longer limited to how much funding will be needed for the next budget year. It revolves around what economy Ukraine will have after the war—and whether it will have enough people, enterprises, and investments to secure its future.
Military resilience allows the state to defend itself. Economic resilience determines whether it can grow after hostilities cease.
And it is this balance between the two tasks that will increasingly define Ukraine's strategic decisions in the coming years.
If Monin's forecast of a low probability of a renewed war proves correct, its conclusion could become not only a military-political compromise but also a starting point for economic recovery. If peace turns out to be unstable, Ukraine risks facing new security threats even before overcoming the consequences of the previous phase of war.
Ultimately, the most important question is not only how many more years Ukraine can fight but what the price of those years will be for its future.
This material is prepared based on an interview with economist Danilo Monin and additional commentary by the author. The provided forecast estimates and scenarios reflect the position of the interviewee and are not confirmed official forecasts.