Russia’s Next Leader Could Be Even More Hostile to the West, Analysts Warn

Examining Russia’s Political Landscape

According to ХВИЛЯ: In a column for The Observer, Andrei Soldatov explores the prospects for political change in Russia, arguing that sudden upheavals have historically been driven by elite factions rather than popular uprisings. He points out that while drone strikes and economic sanctions may slow Russia’s military capacity, they are unlikely to trigger an immediate collapse. Since 2022, the most significant challenges to President Vladimir Putin have come from escalations of the war itself, not from efforts to end it.

Every summer, hopes for abrupt political transformation revive among Russia’s liberal intelligentsia. However, Soldatov cautions that these expectations may be out of touch with reality. He notes that in 1991, political change was orchestrated by the KGB and the military; in October 1993, it was initiated by parliament and Yeltsin’s vice president. In 2023, Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted a similar shift.

Soldatov also observes that the mass protests of 2011–2012 in Moscow never posed a serious threat to the regime. Today, drone strikes target Russian cities, including Saint Petersburg, where one attack occurred on the opening day of an economic forum. Despite sanctions and Western arms supplies such as Javelins, Leopards, F-16s, and Starlink, the battlefield situation has not fundamentally changed.

Outlook for Political Change

Soldatov notes that

“a coup is always possible in a closed political system like Russia’s. The problem is that Putin could just as easily be replaced by someone even more hostile to the West and Ukraine.”

He emphasizes that

“this does not mean change in Russia is impossible. It means that those waiting for change should pay less attention to public discontent and more to the incentives of the people who control the instruments of force.”

The war in Ukraine has repeatedly generated false hopes of a rapid Russian collapse. This was evident during the Russian army’s withdrawal from Kherson, at the start of the 2023 counteroffensive, and during Prigozhin’s march on Moscow. Soldatov suggests it is more useful to recall what ultimately ended the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s: exhaustion. Drone strikes combined with sanctions may reduce Russia’s offensive capabilities and slow its war machine, but they are unlikely to achieve much more.

Soldatov’s analysis reflects the complex political reality in Russia, where internal change typically depends on elites rather than popular discontent. This underscores the importance of understanding power dynamics within the country, as elites are likely to initiate change only when they perceive a threat to their own interests. With the war in Ukraine ongoing and external pressure persisting, the situation remains highly unstable but is unlikely to produce rapid or dramatic shifts in the near term.

As geopolitical tensions rise, the implications of military actions on domestic politics in Russia become increasingly significant. Recent events, such as the reduced scale of Moscow's Victory Day parade, highlight the Kremlin's vulnerability to external threats, which may influence the stability of Putin's regime and the potential for a more aggressive successor.