The draft budget of Ukraine for 2027 has been formulated as if a high-intensity war will persist for at least another year. A record 4.885 trillion UAH is allocated for security and defense. However, behind the confident expenditure figures lies a significantly less certain revenue figure: of the necessary $52.6 billion in external financing, approximately $32.6 billion still lacks confirmed sources.
The optimistic thesis that "there is money in Europe, the problem is only in political decisions" oversimplifies the situation. The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance indeed bases its calculations on the need to attract about $52.6 billion in external support in 2027, but about $32.6 billion of that amount still needs to be secured through agreements with partners.
This does not mean that money will not be available. But there is a huge difference between "partners potentially able to find it" and "partners legally and politically committed to providing it." The budget already has an expenditure part. The full set of checks for it is not yet available.
Budget for Continued War
The very scale of the document leaves little doubt about the scenario Kyiv is preparing for. Total expenditures are planned at the level of 7.272 trillion UAH, of which 4.885 trillion UAH is for security and defense, or 43.8% of the projected GDP. Compared to the revised plan of 2026, this is about 518 billion UAH more.
This is not a budget for a country hoping to transition from war to reconstruction in the spring. This is a budget for yet another year of extensive warfare. And here lies the main paradox: the state already approximately knows how much it plans to spend, but it does not yet know where it will obtain the entire required amount.
The unconfirmed $32.6 billion amounts to about 62% of the entire declared need for external financing. This is too much to close the gap with just one further tranche from the IMF or a single concession from Brussels. Kyiv needs a whole coalition of creditors: the EU, the IMF, G7, the World Bank, the UK, and other partners.
The Brussels ATM Has a Limit
Here arises the illusion of "European money." On paper, the amounts are indeed huge. The Ukraine Facility envisages up to €50 billion for 2024-2027, but it is not a reserve bag of money from which Kyiv can simply ask for a few more tens of billions. The program is planned for four years, has its own structure of loans and grants, payment schedules, and conditions for reforms. A significant portion of the resources has already been mobilized.
At the same time, it is incorrect to say that "Europe has no more money." The EU has created a separate large mechanism to support Ukraine for 2026-2027, covering both budgetary and military needs. The problem is not the physical absence of euros in Europe. The problem is which part of these resources can be converted into guaranteed financing specifically for the Ukrainian budget of 2027, in what time frame, and under what conditions.
For the Ministry of Finance, this is a principal difference. Potential €10 billion and a signed agreement for €10 billion are two completely different things.
Record 4.885 Trillion UAH Does Not Mean Record Amounts of Weapons
The nominal increase in the defense budget also appears misleading. Compared to the revised plan for 2026, spending on security and defense increases by approximately 11.9%. But the structure of this increase is much more interesting than the percentage itself.
For salary payments and contributions, 1.792 trillion UAH has been allocated – about 337.5 billion more, while for armament and military equipment, around 2.299 trillion UAH is planned, which is almost unchanged from the revised figure for 2026.
In other words, a significant portion of the nominal increase in the defense budget does not translate into a similar increase in weapon purchases. War simply becomes more expensive. People, compensations, repairs, logistics, fuel, ammunition, and the maintenance of a vast military machine consume ever more funds.
Therefore, it would be an exaggeration to automatically interpret the increase in the salary fund as evidence of preparations for a new wave of mobilization. The budget shows a sharp rise in personnel costs, but does not clarify which part goes to recruitment increases, which to payments, and which to other expenses. Meanwhile, the virtually unchanged nominal budget for weapon purchases indicates another: a record military budget does not guarantee a record increase in combat capability.
There Is Another War Accounting
There is also a reverse nuance. Not all Western military assistance goes through the Ukrainian budget. The government expects to receive at least around 1 trillion UAH in material and technical assistance in 2027 – weapons, missiles, equipment, shells, and other resources, which partners pay for or provide separately.
Therefore, the formula that "there is a $32.6 billion budget shortfall – therefore, exactly $32.6 billion is missing from the army" would also be incorrect. The Ukrainian war is financed through two parallel systems: Kyiv's monetary budget and the material supplies from partners.
However, this correction does not resolve the fundamental problem. If tens of billions in external budget financing do not materialize, the government will have to either raise taxes, increase domestic borrowing, cut expenditures, or again seek new financial arrangements from partners.
Who Will Sign the Check?
This, rather than a tax on packages up to €150, is the central question of the 2027 budget. Finding $32.6 billion in the global financial system is technically not difficult. The challenge lies in finding governments willing to allocate that money.
There are many options: EU loans, grants, new joint debt, G7 mechanisms, revenues from frozen Russian assets, bilateral contributions, additional IMF programs. Each has its own legal structure, political conditions, and timing.
That is why the government reacts so nervously to any failure to meet Brussels or IMF conditions. A tax on packages alone will not close the $32.6 billion gap. But the failure to enact unpopular reforms gives creditors an obvious argument: why should the European taxpayer mobilize additional billions if Kyiv is unwilling to mobilize its own revenues?
Therefore, partner requirements are not just accounting. They are part of the negotiations about who will pay for the next year of war.
Budget for Faith
As a result, the 2027 budget resembles not a budget for victory or defeat, but rather a budget of inertia. It operates on the assumption that the war will continue at approximately current rates, the army will require record nominal expenditures, Europe will maintain large-scale support, the IMF will remain in the program, the G7 will not lose political unity, and the missing tens of billions will be managed over the coming months.
Each of these assumptions individually is quite plausible. The problem is that the budget requires almost all of them to be realized simultaneously.
That is why $32.6 billion is the central figure of the 2027 budget. Not because that money will certainly be absent. And not because the West is incapable of finding it. But because Ukraine has already accounted for future expenditures, while partners have not yet signed all the future checks.
Kyiv already knows the cost of another year of war. It does not yet know who will pay the entire bill.